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Beretsky: Civil RICO and Anti-Abortion Protest: Must Protestors Profit?: NO

NOTE
CIVIL RICO AND ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST:
MUST PROTESTORS PROFIT?: NOW, INc. v. SCHEIDLER,

968 F.2D 612 (7TH CIR. 1992)

No man profiteth but by the loss of others.'
INTRODUCTION

Large-scale anti-abortion rights groups have become increasingly
effective in organizing, planning, and conspiring to shut down abortion

clinics across the country. Between 1977 and 1989, 117 clinics were the
targets of arson and bombing, 250 received bomb threats, 231 were invaded
and 224 vandalized.' From 1988 to 1990, almost 40,000 people were
arrested in Operation Rescue demonstrations 3 and incidents of reported

vandalism more than doubled from 1991 to 1992.1 Violence has escalated
to the point that women's rights groups have likened protesters to "domestic

terrorists"' and doctors refuse to provide women with abortions because they
have come to fear for their lives.' The battle to preserve abortion rights has

1.

MONTAIGNE, ESSAYS I, xxi.

2. Susan Faludi, The Anti-Abortion Crusade of Randy Terry: Operation Rescue's Jailed
Leader and his FeministRoots, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1989, at C2. Protesters have run down
clinic employees with their cars and have kidnapped them along with their patients. Id.
3. Tamar Lewin, With Thin Staff and Thick Debt, Anti-Abortion Group Faces Struggle,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1990, at A16. Founded by Christian fundamentalist Randall Terry,
Operation Rescue has provided the "shock troops" of the anti-abortion movement with
demonstrations that it calls 'rescues' since 1987. Id. Most arrests occur during clinic "blitzes"
where protesters use a method called "lock and block" which involves pouring glue into clinic
locks and locking individual protesters themselves to clinic doors. NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968
F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. June 14, 1993) (No. 92-

780).

4. See Larry Rohter, Doctor Is Slain During Protest Over Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, March
11, 1993, at Al.
5. David E. Anderson, Abortion Foes Accused of Using More Violence, UPI, Washington
News, Jan. 21, 1986 (statement of Kate Michaelman, Executive Director of the National
Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL). Domestic terrorist groups include neo-Nazi, Ku
Klux Klan, and other violent racist and anti-Semitic organizations, that commit crimes including
'armed robbery, synagogue bombing, murder and arson." See G. Robert Blakely & Thomas
A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various
Proposalsfor Reform: "Motherof God-Is This the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851,
971 n.390 (1990).
6. See Judith Warner, The Assassination of Dr. Gunn: Scare Tactics Turn Deadly, Ms.,
May/June 1993, at 86; Rohter, supranote 4, at Al; Felicity Barringer, Slaying Is a Call to Arms
for Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1993, at A10 (Dr. Warren Hem, medical director
of the Boulder Abortion Clinic noted, "I work in four layers of bullet-proof windows. Death
threats are so common they are not remarkable.").
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always been met with heated and emotional debate. Recently, however, the
stakes have become deadly.
With the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade7 in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,8 and the

election of a proclaimed pro-choice President, anti-abortion activist groups
are likely to become even more vocal in their crusades to be heard. 9 Calling
abortion clinics "abortuaries" and labeling incidents of criminal trespass
"rescues," followers of these organizations assert that their mission to
enforce "higher laws" are not protests against the right to abortion in
general, but rather, direct "interven[tions] to protect particular lives
threatened with imminent destruction." 10 While the anti-abortion movement
has attempted to invoke the common law and statutory doctrines of necessity
and justification in defense of its actions," courts have refused to apply the
defenses to incidents of bodily harm, the destruction of property, or unlawful
trespasses which occur during demonstrations.' 2 Some protesters see
themselves as reminiscent of abolitionists who maintained the Underground

Railroad in violation of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.13 They claim to be
using the same tactics of civil disobedience used to assertthe civil rights of

7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (re-emphasizing fundamental right to privacy which enables
women to choose abortions whose regulation by the state is not unduly burdensome).
9. The Planned Parenthood Federation of America predicted that the November 1992
presidential election would trigger more incidents of violence and assault. The National
Abortion Federation estimates projected that reported crimes including vandalism, bombing,
arson, trespass, assault, battery, burglary, death threats and murder would increase from 186
in 1992 to 269 in 1993. "The last time we saw this level of violence was after Roe v. Wade and
in the early years of the Carter administration." Warner, supra note 6, at 86.
10. See Charles E. Rice, Issues Raised by the Abortion Rescue Movement, 23 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 15, 28 (1989). Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Feminism andAbortion, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS,
June 10, 1993 at 28 ("Most feminists do not hold that a fetus is a person with moral rights of
its own, but they do insist that it is a creature of moral consequence. They emphasize not the
woman's right suggested by the rhetoric of privacy, but a woman's responsibility to make a
complex decision that she is best placed to make.").
11. The affirmative defense of necessity is claimed by a criminal defendant when he or she
believes that commission of a crime is necessary in order to prevent a "greater" harm from
occurring. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, §
50, at 381 (1972). See also Arlene D. Boxerman, Commentary, The Use of the Necessity
Defense by Abortion ClinicProtesters, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 677, 677 (1990) ("Since
at least 1978, anti-abortion activists have been attempting to raise the necessity defense to
criminal trespass charges arising out of abortion clinic demonstrations.").
12. Rice, supra note 10, at 16. Assuming, in direct contradiction to Roe that the fetus is
a "person," anti-abortionists point to the Model Penal Code to argue that the justification defense
sanctions property destruction and even death during protests if caused in the attempt to preserve
the fetus's life. Id. The courts, however, have rejected the argument repeatedly. See James
0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, "Choice of Evils, "Necessity, Duress, or Similar Defense to State
or Local Criminal Charges Based on Acts of Public Protest,3 A.L.R. 5th 521 (1992); see also
Wichita v. Tilson, 855 P.2d 911 (Kan. 1993); Erlandson v. State, 763 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 852 (1989); People v. Smith, 514 N.E.2d 211 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987); Commonwealth v. Wall, 539 A.2d 1325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
13. Rice, supra note 10, at 30 n.85 (citing A. McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONALHISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 533-39 (1935)).
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blacks in the 1960's.14 Others find the comparison ironic and argue that the
anti-abortion protesters are attempting to use those same strategies to deny
the civil rights of women.15
State civil and criminal laws have too often proven inadequate and
ineffective in preventing violence and prosecuting offenders.16 Discretionary enforcement on the local level leads to inconsistent results 17 and

dropped charges.' 8 In addition, trespass violations result in minimum fines,
short jail sentences,

19

and do not deter those and other would-be trespassers

from blockading clinics again.'
Promotional literature written and
distributed by some anti-abortion groups acknowledges the reality that state
criminal justice systems are unable to contain demonstrators who perceive
arrest as a desirable goal."1 Even clinics that file and succeed in suits
14. Id. at 15.
15. See John H. Henn & Maria Del Monaco, Recent Development, Civil Rights and RICO:
Stopping Operation Rescue, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 251-52 (1990) ("Just as Southern
politicians once stood in the doorways of schoolhouses to prevent African-American schoolchildren from passing through to exercise their constitutionally protected right to desegregated
education, today anti-abortion blockaders stand in the doorways of abortion clinics to prevent
women from passing through to exercise their constitutional right to choose abortion.").
16. Virtually all of the state civil remedies are weak and ineffective because they lack the
ability to "proscribe repeated, unlawful acts carried on by a single group of persons pursuant
to an overall plan." Id. at 267. "[A] patchwork of State and local laws is inherently inadequate
to address what is a nationwide, interstate phenomenon... [since] State court injunction powers
end at State lines, and a State cannot easily reach persons in other States who may have planned
the illegal acts." S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RESOURCES, FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC
ENTRANCES ACT, S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Committee Reports File, at * 18.
17. Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 15, at 268 (state criminal statutes, often prohibiting
vague crimes such as disorderly conduct, can often be construed in ways that make them
inapplicable to anti-abortion rights protesters); Carrie Miller, Recent Development, Abortion,
Protest, and ConstitutionalProtection-Beringv. Share, 721 P.2d 918 (Wis. 1986), 62 WASH.
L. REv. 311, 332 (1987) (statutory interpretation of state criminal laws enjoining "threatening,"
"intimidating," or "coercive" behavior lead to discretionary enforcement and require ongoing
judicial management).
18. See, e.g., Tom Coakley, Abortion Clinic Blockers Cleared, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1,
1989, at 33. See also Abortion Clinic Violence, Oversight HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 29 (1987) (statement of Heather Green, Director of Community Education, Hillcrest
Clinic, Norfolk, Va.).
19. See, e.g., Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1292 (D.C. 1979) (imposing a $50
fine); People v. Smith, 514 N.E.2d 211, 212 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (imposing $100 fine and two
years court supervision); Judge Relents on Jail Terms forAnti-Abortion Protesters,N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1989, at 6; Coakley, supra note 18.
20. NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that one defendant
before the court had been arrested more than three hundred times in violation of state criminal
trespass laws); Crozer Chester Medical Center v. May, 506 A.2d 1377, 1378 & n.3 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986); Judge Fines 10for Protests over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1990, at B1.
21. See, e.g., OPERATION RESCUE, JOIN US IN OPERATION RESCUE (pamphlet announcing
blockages in New York City during the week of April 30 to May 7, 1988) ("It is most unlikely
that you will be compelled to serve a jail sentence. And if we have hundreds of rescuers risking
arrest, the likelihood of a severe penalty is even less."); Women's Health Care Services v.
Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258, 265-66 (D. Kan. 1991) ("By targeting Wichita as the focus
of its national efforts, Operation Rescue has virtually overwhelmed the resources of the city's
relatively small police forces to respond with dispatch and effectiveness.").
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against protest groups are often foiled by the refusal of organizers to pay
adverse judgments and their ability to conceal financial assets.'
In response to the growing need for strong federal grounds of relief,
Congress has just recently drafted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act which creates federal criminal and civil remedies for women and clinics
who are intentionally injured, intimidated or interfered with because they
seek or provide reproductive health services.' Prior to this piece of
legislation, abortion-rights groups such as the National Organization for
Women (NOW) and the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL)
invoked various judicial remedies to counter the demonstrations. These
included creative (but not always successful) federal claims under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,24 the Sherman Antitrust Act,' and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 6
Courts 27 and commentators' are divided on the appropriateness of
defining anti-abortion groups as the type of organization Congress intended
to reach in passing RICO, which was part of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.29 Courts are even further divided as to whether the statute
should be limited only to cases involving parties driven by economic
motivation." NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler,3' a Seventh Circuit case currently
22. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 172 (1990) (citing Susan
Faludi, Where Did Randy Go Wrong?, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1989, at 27-28.).
23. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(imposes criminal sanctions and provides civil remedies to individuals who by force or threat
of force, intentionally injure, intimidate, or interfere with any person seeking reproductive health
services or who intentionally destroys the property of a medical facility providing reproductive
health services); infra note 164.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). See, e.g., Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,
620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). See, e.g., NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612
(7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. June 14, 1993) (No. 92-780).
27. Compare Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) with West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 (2d
Cir. 1990).
28. Compare Michele R. Moretti, Note, Using Civil RICO to BattleAnti-Abortion Violence:
Is the Last Weapon in the Arsenal a Sword of Damocles?, 25 NEw ENG L. REv. 1363 (1991)
(suggesting an expansive interpretation of RICO is essential to combat social harms caused by
anti-abortion extortionists) with Anne Melley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life
Demonstrators are Racketeers?, 56 UMKC L. REV. 287 (1988) (suggesting that without
limitation to situations originally intended by Congress, RICO statute may have to be abandoned
as an abusive, harsh, and overreaching provision) and Norman Abrams, Seeing Demonstrators
as Extortionists, L.A. TIMES, Op-Ed, Nov. 12, 1989, at M5 (arguing that when a prosecutor
refuses to file criminal charges under RICO, a private plaintiff should be barred from seeking
civil damages).

29. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
30. Compare Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 612 with Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts,
No. C86-161(V)D, 1988 WL 156656 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
31. 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. June 14, 1993)

(No. 92-780).
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before the Supreme Court, directly addresses the difficulties of interpreting
and applying RICO to anti-abortion protesters and provides an opportunity
for the Court to confront problems that have been plaguing the lower federal
courts for years.32 The Court's decision in Scheidler, however, reaches
beyond the abortion rights debate: the question presented asks whether any
RICO enterprise or predicate act must have "an overriding economic motive"
in addition to the requirement that the challenged conduct affect interstate
commerce and injure the plaintiffs "business or property."33 Thus,
although the issue reaches the Court in the context of an abortion rights case,
a decision which recognizes the existence of an economic motive requirement
in all future civil RICO claims may have potentially far-reaching implications.
Part I of this Note canvasses the history of RICO and analyzes the circuit
split on economic motive requirements in civil RICO claims. Part II
examines Scheidler, a civil RICO claim brought by women's rights groups
and women's health clinics against anti-abortion protest groups including the
Pro-Life Action League, the Pro-Life Action Network, and Operation
Rescue. Part Im views Scheidler as misguided in its application of civil
RICO to anti-abortion protesters and argues that RICO is an appropriate
federal remedy in such suits. Part IV considers the continued applicability
of RICO to anti-abortion protesters after Scheidler, regardless of any
economic motive requirement.
Finally, this Note concludes that while recent decisions of the Supreme
Court have limited federal jurisdiction in abortion rights cases, both the
executive and legislative branches have worked to expand that jurisdiction.
For example, Congress has recently created federal criminal and civil rights
causes of action under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. 34
This Act, however, does not eliminate the need to seek alternative forms of
relief. Therefore, civil RICO still remains a viable remedy.
I. PRIOR LAW

A. RICO and its Requirements
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, of which

RICO was Title IX, 5 in an effort to "seek eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering
process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced

32. The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari on this divisive issue as recently as two
years ago. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
33. NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, 62 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1993).
34. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, S. 636, § 2715, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Committee Reports File; infra note 164.
35. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941.
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sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime."36 RICO provides both criminal penalties and
civil remedies for the commission of any of four types of prohibited
activities: (1) investing income derived from racketeering in an interstate
enterprise (money laundering);37 (2) acquiring or maintaining an interest in
such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;3" (3) conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; 39 and (4)
conspiring to violate any of the above provisions.' In addition, civil RICO
awards treble damages to victims claiming injury due to a violation of the
statute,41 and any person injured in her business or property by reason of a
violation of RICO has standing to sue.42 "Racketeering activity" is defined
as any act or threat chargeable under enumerated state and federal laws.43
These acts, called "predicate offenses," include diverse crimes such as

murder, Hobbes Act extortion, mail fraud, white slave trafficking, arson and
money laundering. 4 An "enterprise" for RICO purposes is defined as both
a legal or a nonlegal entity associated in fact either individually or as

36. Id. at 922-23 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal ... to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate commerce.").
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for any person employed or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.").
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.").
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) ("Any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
42. Id.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1988) (defines "racketeering activity" to include murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drug offenses punishable under State law by imprisonment for
more than one year).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988) (enumerates more than 32 separate acts indictable under
selected provisions of Title 18 which qualify as RICO "predicate offenses." The offenses range
from sports bribery and trafficking of motor vehicle parts to wire fraud and obstruction of
justice).
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partnerships, unions or corporations;45 and a "pattern of racketeering
activity" is established by the commission of two or more predicate offenses
within a ten year period by any member of an enterprise.'
After enactment, the criminal provisions of RICO immediately "became
the new darling of the prosecutor's nursery," however, the civil provisions
"sat virtually unused on the library shelf for some ten years." 47 Prior to the
Supreme Court's clarification of the meaning and scope of civil RICO in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. ,48 the statute was "floundering in a sea of
judicial distaste."4 9 Many circuits were unwilling to expand the reach of
the civil provisions beyond the stereotypical "mobster" and were uneasy
about attaching the "racketeering" label to the activities of legitimate business
enterprises,50 despite the fairly straightforward directive of Congress that
the provisions of RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purpose. "51

In Sedima, a business fraud action involving a Belgian importer and an
American electronics manufacturer, the plaintiff alleged fraud in the

preparation of purchase orders, breach of contract and three counts of
"racketeering"

1962(c)). 52

under the treble damages provision of 18 U.S.C.

§

The Supreme Court, for the first time explicitly commanded

that "RICO is to be read broadly ...

[as] an aggressive initiative to supple-

45. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988) ("[E]nterprise" includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity.).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988) ("[P]attem of racketeering activity" requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and
the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.).
47. See Melley, supra note 28, at 291 (quoting Joan G. Wexler, Civil RICO Comes ofAge:
Some MaturationalProblems and Proposalsfor Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 285, 285 (1983));
see also Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. CORP., BANKING AND
BUSINESS LAW 55 (noting that of the 270 federal district court decisions interpreting civil RICO
prior to 1985, only 3 percent (nine cases) were decided in the entire decade from 1970 to 1979).
48. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
49. Geri J. Yonover, FightingFire With Fire: Civil RICO and Anti-Abortion Activists, 12
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153, 159 (1990).

50. See Donald J. Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c):
Conflicting Precedent and the Practitioner'sDilemma, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731-32 (1984); see also
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting concern that
"respected and legitimate 'enterprises' [such] as the American Express Co., E.F. Hutton & Co.,
Lloyd's of London ... and Merrill Lynch" had all been labeled "racketeers" in civil RICO
claims).
51. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 947. But
see Craig W. Palm, Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167
(1980) (arguing that the liberal construction clause of RICO should govern only when the plain
meaning of the statute is ambiguous). See also William Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice
at the A.B.A. Mid-Year Meeting in Denver, Colo. 1-12 (Feb. 6, 1989) (stating that "[a] sharp
curtailment of the basis for civil RICO action.., would.., help to cut down on the work of
the federal courts").
52. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483.
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ment old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime." 53 Sedima
held generally that there is no prior conviction threshold requirement to a
private action brought under § 1964(c), 4 nor is there any requirement that
the plaintiff must establish any specifiable "racketeering injury" beyond one
that normally results from the finding of a "pattern of racketeering activity"
under the statute.' Justice Powell warned in dissent that civil RICO claims
after the Court's decision would result in unfettered resort to RICO and an

inappropriate federalization of future claims alleging what should be ordinary
common law wrongs and whose remedies are properly left to the states6
Since Sedima's liberal interpretative holding, lower courts and commentators have also expressed Justice Powell's fears of RICO's further expansion

and have limited the statute by imposing on it an economic motive requirement.

7

While the plain language of RICO does not explicitly state that

proscribed activity must be driven by financial motive or purpose, its
application to non-economic actors has been confined. The room for
statutory interpretation has led plaintiffs to implicate the statute in novel ways
that some claim to have been unforeseen by its framers;5 however, the
Supreme Court itself admonished in Sedima that the "fact that RICO has
been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."59 The Court further
noted that if its application of RICO against those other than "archetypal,
intimidating mobsters" was defective, the difficulty was "inherent in the
statute as written," and therefore, "its correction must lie with Congress. "°

53. Id. at 497.
54. Id. at 493.
55. Id. at 495.
56. Id. at 530 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. "[I]t appears that the [Sedima] majority, the commentators, and even the dissent did not
contemplate the uses to which the broadened reading of the RICO cause of action could be put
in the noncommercial world. Following the Sedima directive, courts could now allow RICO to
be applied in extraordinary ways." Catherine Reid, Note, Limiting Political Expression by
Expanding RacketeeringLaws: The Danger of Applying a Commercial Statute in the Political
Realm, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 201, 213 (1988). See, e.g., Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 634 F. Supp.
1284, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (famous murder case in which a wealthy victim qualified as an
"enterprise" under RICO, and her husband's alleged plans to kill her qualified as a "pattern of
racketeering activity" within the meaning of the statute).
58. "RICO has moved beyond logic and intent into areas far removed from racketeering.
Originally intended to combat organized crime, RICO is used increasingly in ideological
disputes." Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. Rnv. 805, 806
(1990). See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984) (expressing
distress at the "extraordinary, if not outrageous" uses of RICO and its use as a tool in everyday
fraud cases).
59. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)).
60. Id.
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B. Split in Circuits on Economic Motive Requirement

Despite Justice Powell's call for clarifying legislation, Congress has
never acted on the economic motive question; although it has considered
amending civil RICO several times.61 In the meantime, the lower courts
have hopelessly lacked direction in civil RICO cases where the actors are not
clearly or solely inspired by monetary gains or incentives. Confusion runs
rampant among the Circuit Courts of Appeals. For example, the Second and
Eighth Circuits have explicitly demanded an economic motive under RICO,
finding that either the "enterprise" or the "predicate acts" provision of the

statute requires it.62 The Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits appear to
reject financial motive, but have not had to consider a close case directly. 63
The Third Circuit has held that an economic motive is not required when the
predicate act which violates RICO is a Hobbes Act' crime, but the court
had no occasion to decide what other predicate acts may not require

61. In response to Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.
1989), Senator Dennis Deconcini introduced a bill in an attempt to "restore the usefulness and
effectiveness of the RICO statute that existed prior to the explosion of abusive and harassing
lawsuits filed in the 1980's." See RICO Reform Act of 1989, S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
135 Cong. Rec. 2646, 2659 (Feb. 23, 1989). The bill, which was not enacted, proposed to
amend the statute to include: "additional predicate offenses within the definition of "racketeering
activity," such as prostitution involving minors, computer fraud, and certain activity relating to
terrorist acts abroad and to exclude from such definition participation in, or support of, nonviolent public speech undertakenfor reasons other than economic .... " See S. Rep. No. 269,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. S4923 (daily ed. April 24, 1990) (emphasis added).
Similar attempts to amend RICO followed in 1990 and in 1991, but were not successful. Both
versions attempted to limit a private plaintiff's resort to RICO by heightening the standard of
proof to "clear and convincing" and to limit the treble damage provision to "major participants"
engaging in "egregious" criminal conduct. See RICO Amendments Act of 1990, H. Rep. 975,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. H12420 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); RICO Amendments
Act of 1991, H.R. Rep. 312, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Cong. Rec. H9757 (daily ed. Nov. 13,
1991).
62. See United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974
(1988), aff'g United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983);
United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
63. Although the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits reject a "financial benefit" requirement
under RICO, the defendants before the courts were clearly profit-oriented. See Adam D. Gale,
Note, The Use of Civil RICO Against Anti-Abortion Protesters and the Economic Motive
Requirement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1357 n.124 (1990) (citing United States v. Webster,
669 F.2d 185, 186-87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982)); United States v. Hartley,
678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). See also United States v.
Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981) (finding
economic motive irrelevant because the statute "prescribe[s] conduct without regard to the status
of ultimate objectives of the person engaging in it.").
64. The Hobbes Act makes it a crime to extort property from a business engaged in
interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) & (b)(2) (1988); infra note 82.
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economic motive.' Finally, a Washington District Court has refused to
require any economic motivation under RICO at all.6
The Second Circuit was the first to identify an economic motive
requirement for RICO violations in United States v. Ivic.67 There, the court
held that political organizations (Croatian nationalists), constituted an
enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 only if their terroristic activities were
designed as a "profit-seeking venture" whose purpose was to infiltrate
legitimate businesses.68 The court held that because neither the enterprise
nor the racketeering predicate acts had a financial purpose, RICO was not
violated. 69 The Second Circuit soon afterward clarified Ivic's reasoning in
United States v. Bagaric,70 another case involving Croatian nationalists.
There, the court stated that economic motivation under § 1962 does not have
to constitute the predominant purpose motivating a RICO defendant's
enterprise or predicate acts; the requirement is satisfied as long as there
exists an objectively visible economic goal for either.7 The court recognized that while non-profit political organizations by definition do not exist
primarily to make money, the existence of a monetary goal that was
subordinate to the main objective of achieving Croatian independence
was
72
sufficient to satisfy RICO's economic motive requirement.
Like the Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit requires economic motive
under RICO. However, the enterprise must be "directed toward an economic
goal," 73 and in addition, it must have a "discrete economic association
existing separately from the racketeering activity."74 This implies an
adaptation on the Second Circuit's reasoning in Ivic to demand proof that the
enterprise is economically motivated regardless of whether or not the
predicate acts alleged have any financial purpose.75 Economic purpose,
however, is construed broadly.

65. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
66. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(V)D, 1988 WL 156656
(W.D. Wash. 1988).
67. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 60.
69. Id. at 59.
70. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
71. Id. at 55.
72. Id. at 58.
73. United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974

(1988).

74. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981).
75. Cf. Mary L. Perry, Note, JudicialCreation of an EconomicRequirement UnderRICO:
Time to Dismantle the Barricade,68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1021, 1033 n.92 (arguing "that the Flynn
decision did not resolve the question of whether the Eighth Circuit would allow a RICO claim
against an enterprise without an economic goal if the predicate acts did not have an economic
orientation.").
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For example, in United States v. Flynn,76 the Eighth Circuit held that
the defendant member of a group constituting an enterprise under RICO
acted with others to carry out the "common purpose" of "dominat[ing] local
labor unions."' The court held that the enterprise profited economically
from the domination, even though it received no money, by committing the
predicate offenses of murder and the conspiracy to murder a rival labor union
leader.78 Therefore, even though the predicate acts were not overtly
economic in nature, the Eighth Circuit affirmed Flynn's RICO conviction
because the enterprise functioned to achieve an "economic goal." 79
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has explicitly rejected the Second
and Eighth Circuits' formulation of RICO's economic motive requirement-and it did so in an anti-abortion protest case. In Northeast Women's
Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,80 the defendants forcibly entered the clinic on
four occasions, knocked down and injured employees, ransacked medical
cabinets, threw supplies on the floor, and harassed patients. Ultimately some
staff members resigned and the clinic lost its lease.8 ' In its civil RICO suit,
the clinic alleged a violation of the Hobbes Act,' a predicate offense often
implicated and specifically enumerated under RICO,' and claimed that the
protesters extorted the clinic's right to operate a business and its staff's right
to employment.'
The clinic argued that the Hobbes Act itself did not
require a showing of economic motive; therefore, when invoked as a
predicate offense under RICO, no additional economic showing was
required.' In direct contradiction to the Seventh Circuit's later decision in
Scheidler,86 the Third Circuit held that extortion in violation of the Hobbes

76. 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
77. Id. at 1051.
78. Id. at 1052.
79. Id.
80. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
81. Id. at 1346-47.
82. Anyone who "inany way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce in the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion" violates the
Hobbes Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988). "Extortion" is defined as "obtaining I] property of
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1988); supra note 44.
84. Northeast Women's Center, Inc., 868 F.2d at 1350.
85. Id. at 1349-50. Even the Second Circuit does not require that economic motive be

proven to violate the Hobbes Act. See United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970). Thus the difference in the Second and Third
Circuit's interpretation of RICO does not arise from a disagreement over construction of the
Hobbes Act. Perry, supra note 75, at 1034 n. 100.
86. 968 F.2d 612, 629 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that even when the defendant violates the
Hobbes Act, the plaintiff must, in addition, prove that either the "predicate act" or the
.enterprise" has an economic motivation in order to satisfy RICO).
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Act did not require additional proof of an economic motive to satisfy
RICOY Northeast Women's Center, Inc. does not directly answer the
broader question, however, of whether the Third Circuit, like the Second and
Eighth, still requires a showing of economic motive or goal in defining an
enterprise under RICO. 8
In Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, 9 yet another antiabortion case alleging Hobbes Act violations, the Western District of
Washington rejected both an inquiry into the economically motivated activity
and one into the profit-seeking nature of the enterprise. There, the protesters
engaged in various forms and levels of harassment including the making of
"hang-up" phone calls to the Center, occupying all the Center's parking with
their automobiles and creating a gauntlet that patients and employees had to
pass through to enter. 9° One defendant went as far as setting the Center on
fire three times. 9' After the third fire, the Center was forced to close. 2
Relying on Sedima's admonition to broadly construe RICO claims, the
district court explicitly refused to adopt the Second Circuit's economic
motive requirement under Ivic and held that it would be inappropriate to
dismiss the plaintiff's RICO claim based on the lack of evidence supporting
financial motive in the absence of controlling Ninth Circuit precedent. 93
II. NOW, INC. V. SCHEIDLER: THE SUPREME COURT'S OPPORTUNITY TO
LIMIT RICO TO ECONOMIC ACTORS

In NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, 4 the Seventh Circuit rejected the Third
Circuit's decision in Northeast Women's Health Center, Inc.,95 and held that
RICO defendants whose predicate offenses violate the Hobbes Act must still
prove that those acts or the enterprise are economically motivated before civil

87. Northeast Women's Center, Inc., 868 F.2d at 1350. Because the Third Circuit found
economic motive unnecessary to prove a Hobbes Act violation, it specifically refused to consider
whether the evidence offered by the clinic would be sufficient to show economic motivation. Id.

at 1349 n.7.

88. The defendants in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. did not challenge the district court's
charge to the jury which outlined the elements of an "enterprise" under RICO. The instruction
provided that "[a]ll the plaintiff has to prove is the existence of an ongoing organization, either
formal or informal in nature in which the various associates functioned as a continuing unit. The

enterprise must have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it
engages." 868 F.2d at 1348 n.5. Apparently, the Third Circuit, unlike the Second and Eighth,
requires no additional showing that the RICO "enterprise" be financially motivated or have any
monetary purpose or goal.
89. No. C86-161(V)D, 1988 WL 156656 (W.D. Wash. 1988).

90. Id. at *1.
91. Id.

92. Id.
93. Id. at *12 n.2.
94. 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992).
95. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
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RICO liability will attach.96 In this case, the plaintiff NOW, a non-profit
organization aimed at advancing and protecting women's rights, together with
two Illinois women's health centers, claimed that the defendant, Joseph
Scheidler, Executive Director of the Pro-Life Action League,'

together

with members of other anti-abortion activist groups, and employees of VitalMed Inc., a medical testing laboratory, conspired to close all women's health
centers providing abortions through a pattern of illegal activity.9"
NOW claimed that the coalition of anti-abortion groups spearheaded by
Scheidler engaged in the following illegal activities: extortion, physical and
verbal intimidation and threats directed at health center personnel and

patients, trespass, blockades, destruction of center advertising, phone
campaigns designed to tie up health center lines, false appointments to
prevent legitimate patients from making them, and tortious interference with
the centers' business relationships with landlords, patients, personnel and
medical testing laboratories.99
NOW alleged that these acts violated the Sherman Antitrust Act"° and

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).101 The
district court granted Scheidler's motion to dismiss the complaint because it
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under F.R.C.P.

12(b)(6). 1° NOW appealed and the Seventh Circuit "reluctantly" affirmed
the dismissal on the grounds that the Antitrust Act was not intended to apply
to the anti-abortionists' activities and because RICO requires either that the

96. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629.
97. Scheidler has been called the "Green Beret of the abortion" by Christian fundamentalist
and politician Pat Buchanan. See Abortion Clinic Violence, supra note 18, at 64.
98. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 615.
99. Id. NOW's complaint also alleged that two of the defendants established competing
pregnancy testing and counseling facilities, abrasively confronted women entering the facilities
as "sidewalk" counselors, invaded a judge's home, contacted businesses providing goods and
services to clinics, threatened to disrupt and harass them if business transactions with the clinics
continued, and even participated in a conspiracy to steal fetal remains from a medical testing
laboratory. Id. at 615-16. Scheidler kept a full storage drum of the stolen remains in his
backyard for several weeks until they could be parcelled out to anti-abortion organizations in
Indiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Delaware, and Florida. Upon shipment, activists would
hold mass burial services for the fetuses during grisly staged protests. Id. at 616.
100. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) declares illegal "[e]very contract,
combination ...

or conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce. ..

"

101. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988)
(making it "unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt"); 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (making it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(1988) (making it "unlawful to conspire to commit" any of the prohibited acts in 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a), (b), or (c)).
102. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 614.
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group as a whole be an economically motivated enterprise or engaged in
economically motivated predicate acts. 03
The court considered the basis of NOW's RICO claim as a question of
first impression in the Seventh Circuit." First, NOW alleged that the
defendants violated the money laundering provision of RICO § 1962(a)
because the donations received by supporters were derived from their
racketeering activity.0 5 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court's determination that the income Scheidler and the other protesters
received through donations was not "derived directly or indirectlyol from a
pattern of racketeering activity," and therefore was not sufficiently proven
to be the product of extortion as required by the statute. 6 The Seventh
Circuit held that because NOW failed to allege that contributors to the antiabortion organizations would not have donated money to them "but-for" the
groups' acts of criminal trespass, threats and vandalism, the receipt of
donations by itself was an insufficient cause to support a RICO violation
under § 1962(a).'"
Second, the court addressed the precise issue of whether or not RICO
liability could be imposed when neither the "enterprise" nor the "pattern or
racketeering activity" provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) is economically
motivated. 0 3 The court analyzed similar cases from other Circuits which
had split on the issue and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint because NOW had not alleged that the protesters had "some profitgenerating purpose."" While some of the cases examined by the Seventh
Circuit concerning § 1962(c) involved "non-traditional" RICO actors, 10
only two involved anti-abortion protesters specifically, neither one of which
required an economic motive.' While noting that no explicit language in
the statute requires RICO actors to be economically motivated, the Seventh
103. Id. The Seventh Circuit's "reluctance" to dismiss the case is clear in view of the
defendants' egregious illegal acts. The opinion carefully describes clinic invasions by hundreds
of individuals, one of whom the court noted, had already been arrested under state criminal law
charges more than three hundred times. Id. at 615.
104. Id. at 626 ("[W]e have never grappled with the economic motive issue head on.").

105. Id. at 623.
106. Id. at 625.
107. Id. ("The attenuated causal connection between the defendants' criminal trespass,

threats, and vandalism, and their receipt of donations from third parties . . . is simply too
tenuous to satisfy the requirements of § 1962(a).").
108. Id. at 626.
109. Id.
110. The Supreme Court has noted that "although [RICO] had organized crime as its focus,

[it] was not limited in application to organized crime."

See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell

Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989). However, the stated intent of the Seventh Circuit

ruling in Scheidler was not to "extend[] [RICO] so far as the activities of political terrorists" or
"revolutionaries"
unless the "activities were centered around the commission of economic
crimes." 968 F.2d at 628.
111. See Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 626 (citing Northeast Women's Health Center, ie. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3rd Cir. 1989); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No.
C86-161(V)D, 1988 WL 156656 (W.D. Wash. 1988)).
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case
Circuit adopted the profit-oriented limitation imposed by Second Circuit
113
law112 and justified its decision as a matter of statutory interpretation.
While their primary contention was that RICO had no inherent economic
motive requirement, NOW's alternative argument was that even if the
Seventh Circuit found that RICO enterprises or predicate acts under §
1962(c) diddemand economic motivation, the fact that Scheidler and the antiabortionists intended to raise the clinics' "costs of doing business" by
committing acts of extortion was sufficient to satisfy the economic motive
requirement." 4 NOW argued that the protesters acted to generate funds:
they received contributions as a result of their unlawful acts and sold
materials detailing illegal methods of closing health centers."5 Efforts to
generate financial gain for the protest movement, when coupled with the
protesters' economic effect on the clinics, arguably satisfied any implied
economic requirement under RICO. 116 The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
however, found that no Circuit previously imposing economic motive under
RICO had ever specifically held that raising victims' costs could satisfy the
requirement, " 7 and dismissed the argument noting that although "reprehensible criminal and tortious conduct results incidentally in donations to support
it, it is more a comment on the nature of the defendants' supporters than on
the purpose of the defendants' acts."' 18 Therefore, while it adopted the
Second and Eighth Circuits' formulation of an economic motive requirement,
the Seventh Circuit failed to follow suit entirely and interpreted RICO's
financial incentives narrowly. "9 Finally, because the Court of Appeals
found that NOW had alleged no violations sufficient to satisfy 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a) and (c), their claim that Scheidler and the other defendants had
conspired to violate those same sections under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) failed as
well. 2 0
112. See United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1985); see also infra notes 62,
67-72 and accompanying text.
113. See Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629 ("In this case we do not believe we are adding
elements to the offense, but merely fleshing out the definitions of those elements.").
114. Id. at 630.
115. Id. See, e.g., JOSEPH SCHEIDLER, CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION (1985)
(anti-abortion practice manual detailing effective methods of protest ultimately aimed at forcing
abortion clinics out of business). Some of the 99 Chapters in CLOSED instruct protesters on
means of halting a health facility's ability to do business altogether. Chapter 86 is entitled
"Special Clinic Closing Programs: Project Jericho, Three Month Blitz, and Others," id. at 297,
and Chapter 94 addresses "The Abortion Hospital: A Special Problem." Id. at 325. See also
Abortion Clinic Violence, supra, note 18, at 63.
116. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 630.
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. The Second and Eighth Circuits construe the economic motivation requirement
broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55 (2d Cir.) (economic motive
requirement satisfied as long as there exists an objectively visible economic goal), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 840 (1983); United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.) (RICO
"enterprise" must be "directed toward an economic goal"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
120. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 630.
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III. DEFECTS IN SCHEIDLER: RICO's PROPER
APPLICATION TO ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTERS

The Seventh Circuit's decision in Scheidler is defective for two reasons.
First, the opinion fails to adequately explain why economic motive should be
required for a RICO "enterprise" or "predicate act." Second, it fails to
sufficiently outline what type of financial incentive, goal, or motive a future
plaintiff is required to prove. The Seventh Circuit in Scheidler purports to
follow the Second Circuit in requiring economic motive as first enunciated
in Ivic, but then chooses to ignore that Circuit's later decisions which
arguably only require a showing that the RICO enterprise has some financial
impact. '21
In addition, the Scheidler court improperly looked to the implied
economic motivation required by Ivic's construction of the term "enterprise"
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) to guide its statutory interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c). 11 While defining terms consistently within the same statute
admittedly has elemental appeal, this approach fails to note how each of
RICO's individual subsections is targeted at different types of conduct in
which the enterprise plays different roles."2 The effect of such a limited
reading of RICO, unless corrected by the Supreme Court, will have the harsh
and unfortunate result of preventing many otherwise valid and reasonable
RICO claims from ever being considered on the merits. Like the plaintiffs
in Scheidler, future RICO claimants wishing to challenge illegal acts of antiabortion protest will also be dismissed for failing to state a cause of action
121. Id. ("We do not contest that the defendants' activities had an economic effect on the
plaintiffs, we simply refuse to equate that effect with the economic motive required by Ivic and
its progeny."); but c.f., Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 42; United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985).
122. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629. The Second
in Ivic reasoned that the term
"enterprise" as used in subsection (a) "clearly refers to Circuit
the sort of entity in which funds can be
invested and a property interest of some sort acquired, and hence the sort of entity which one
joins to make money." 700 F.2d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit further reasoned
that the same interpretation should apply to the definition of "enterprise" under subsection (c)
because "[w]hen the same word is used in the same section of.an act more than once, and the
meaning is clear in one place, it will be assumed to have the same meaning in other places." Id.
123. Scheidler's adaptation of the Second Circuit's reasoning in Ivic, however, gives no
recognition to the distinct role a RICO "enterprise" plays under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) or (b) on
one hand, and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) on the other:
In subsections (a) and (b), the enterprise is an investment vehicle or target, sometimes
denominated the "prize" or "victim" of the RICO defendant's misconduct. Quite
distinctly, under subsection (c), the enterprise itself is the malefactor. Section
1962(c) is, therefore, directed at preventing or punishing a different ill than that
targeted by section 1962(a) or (b)-namely, enterprise misbehavior (persons conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity). There is no
apparent need or warrant to require that the culprit enterprise of subsection (c) bear
the earmarks of the financial plum or plundered booty envisaged in subsections (a)
and (b). The Second Circuit's conclusion, is at best, the procrustean product of a
perceived consistency at odds with the structure of the statute.
GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A

DEFINITIVE GUIDE
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and thus, their meritorious complaints will not survive even the most
summary stages of federal review.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Scheidler in order to address the
question whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) requires proof that
either the "enterprise" or the "predicate acts" of racketeering activity are
economically motivated.'24 Should the Court require proof of economic
motive, the additional barrier need not necessarily prohibit RICO's
applicability to anti-abortion protesters in the future. However, unless the
Court clearly defines the scope of such a motive within workable constitutional limits, the potential for continued RICO application is questionable.
There is no question that RICO is a powerful weapon against enterprises
that threaten constitutional rights which require the federal courts' imprimatur
and protection."lz Civil RICO has several advantages over state criminal
laws that too often fail to protect the civil rights of women seeking abortions
or abortion counseling. No indictment is necessary before a plaintiff brings
suit, a crime need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, a

standard of proof considerably less demanding than the criminal proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the pleading requirements are more liberal

than those required of a criminal indictment. I"

While some critics argue that RICO's use against anti-abortion extremists

is akin to "using a cannon to go hunting for squirrels,"127 most protest
groups are not small game.

Other commentators note that as highly

organized, sophisticated and economically powerful networks, the groups
establish systems of financial support in an effort to "immunize" their
members from traditional civil and criminal remedies. 2 Like the organi-

124. 61 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. June 14, 1993) (No. 92-780).
125. "The indispensability of such a remedy is readily apparent when reviewing the zeal
with which authorities have prosecuted illegal protest activity. The prevailing attitude has ranged
from reluctant to recalcitrant at local, state, and federal levels of government." Moretti, supra
note 28, at 1398. For example, in response to a clinic firebombing in Everett, Washington, both
the town's police and fire chiefs "publicly suggest[ed] that the clinic staff may have torched their
own clinic to get publicity or collect insurance money .... [Tihe police pressured clinic staff
members to submit to lie detector tests and scrutinized their personal finances." Abortion Clinic
Violence, supra note 18, at 601 (testimony of Betty Maloney).
126. See CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 16-18 (1988); but cf. Califa, supra note 58, at 836 (arguing that free
speech is chilled by loose definitions of "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity,"
"liberal pleading requirements, implication by association, the specter of treble damages, costly
defense, intrusive discovery, and the racketeer label").
127. Melley, supra note 28, at 308. See also Wexler, supra note 47, at 292 n.33 ("RICO
[has been] labeled as 'cruel,' 'totalitarian,' the 'death sentence,' and a tool which can 'reach out
and castrate people'").
128. Moretti, supra note 28, at 1363. The anti-abortion movement supports its members
in crisis. Rescue America raised money to help the family of protester and murderer Michael
Griffin, who shot a doctor outside a Pensacola, Florida clinic. Don Treshman, the head of
Rescue America in Houston claimed that the money was intended to help Griffin's wife and
daughters, not to pay for his legal defense. "We know that the abortionist is well taken care of.
But there is a financial strain for the defendant." See Rita Ciolli, ProtesterSlays Abortionist,
NEWSDAY, March 11, 1993, at 4.
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zations that originally inspired RICO, the rescue movement uses force, fear
and coercion to accomplish "moral" objectives through physical and
psychological intimidation.2 9 Undoubtedly, this was the type of threat to
public welfare that Congress intended to eliminate with its RICO legislation. 30
Drafters of RICO recognized that state and local law enforcement efforts
simply failed to reach the roots of dispersed criminal organizations .3 The
statute was designed to buttress traditional enforcement which only prosecutes
individuals and allows officials to go beyond the individual and strike at the
organized network underlying his or her criminal activity.32 Abortion
protest groups who organize, conspire, and attempt to commit unlawful
activities often perpetuate their goals despite the fact that individual members
may be removed from their ranks.133 "The soldiers, once removed, will
simply be replaced by [others] willing to carry out the aim of the group's
activities."1 34 Civil RICO is an appropriate and effective means of reaching
the source of criminal activity that is easily disguised under the rubrics of
moral protest, political expression or constitutionally protected free
speech.135 In addition, independent studies have concluded that civil RICO
129. See Patricia G. Barnes, Student Work, Civil Disobedience and Civil RICO: AntiAbortionists as Racketeers, 93 W. VA. L. Rnv. 359, 359 (1991). "Today's radical antiabortionists fancy themselves to be a modem-day John Brown," asserting their innocence under
higher law in the same spirit as he who led the revolt at Harper's Ferry to free the slaves. Id.
130. Congress prefaced its intended scope of RICO with a Statement of Findings and
Purpose:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption; ... (3) this money and power are increasingly used to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate businesses and labor unions; ... (4) organized crime
activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23.
131. Michael Goldsmith & Penrod W. Keith, Civil RICO Abuses: The Allegations in
Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 60-61.
132. Id.
133. See Abortion Clinic Violence, supra note 18, at 56-57 (testimony of Joseph M.
Scheidler):
We have no intention of being intimidated by threats to our rights of free speech,
assembly and redress of grievances. We will return again and again to the abortuaries
to talk women out of abortion, to try to convert medical personnel who have turned
their healing profession into a killing profession. We will confront in the courts and
on the streets, every false arrest, every malicious prosecution and every unconstitutional injunction....
134. Jo Anne Pool, Note, Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle: A Message to
PoliticalActivists, 23 AKRON L. REv. 251, 265 (1989).
135. The plaintiff's complaint in Scheidler did not attempt to bar all anti-abortion activities
sine ",peaceful picketing, debate, meetings, prayers, and a host
of other forms of peaceful
protest are protected by the First Amendment. 968 F.2d at 616. The complaint sought relief
for criminal and tortious acts unrelated to constitutionally protected free speech such as
"trespass, clinic invasion, vandalism, extortion, and tortious interference with business
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is effective against highly organized conspiracies because it "facilitate[s] the
prosecution of a criminal group involved in superficially unrelated criminal
ventures and enterprises connected only at the usually well-insulated upper
levels of the organization's bureaucracy." 36 Therefore, it seems obvious
that the Seventh Circuit's close-minded approach to RICO in Scheidlerresults
in an unreasonable emasculation of a potentially powerful and expansive
statute.
IV. CONTINUED APPLICATION OF RICO TO ANTI-ABORTION
PROTESTERS AFTER SCHEIDLER

A. The Plain Language of the Statute Requires No Economic Motive
Before granting certiorari in Scheidler, the Supreme Court invited the
Solicitor General of the United States to respond to the applicability of an
economic motive requirement under civil RICO." 7 The newly formed
Clinton administration refused to require one.' 38 Likewise, NOW and
other plaintiffs have continually argued that Congress defined "enterprise"

and "racketeering activity" clearly and precisely to avoid any need to look
for hidden meanings or to require judicial amendments. In other words, if
Congress meant to require economic motive, it would have said so.3 9 In
enacting RICO, concern was centered on the effect of concerted criminal
conduct on business and interstate enterprise, and not the motives of those

relationships." Id.
136. Blakely & Perry, supra note 5, at 856 n.12. See also Organized Crime: 25 Years
After Valachi: HearingsBefore the PermanentSubcomm. on Interrogationsof the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 505 (1988) (Statement of David C. Williams,
Director, Office of Special Investigations, General Accounting Office):
Before the Act, the government's efforts were necessarily piecemeal, attacking
isolated segments on the organization as they engaged in single criminal acts....
The larger meaning of these crimes was lost because the big picture could not be
presented in a single criminal prosecution. With the passage of RICO, the entire
picture of the organization's criminal behavior and the involvement of its leaders in
directing the behavior could be captured and presented.
137. 61 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1993) (No. 92-780). Represented by Solicitor
General Drew S. Days, III, the Department of Justice is arguably the greatest outside influence
on Supreme Court decision-making. The Solicitor General has been called both a "handmaiden"
to the Court and its "10th Justice." Joan Biskupic, Lag on Solicitor General May Benefit Bush
Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1993, at A4.
138. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7-8, NOW, Inc.
v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. June 14,
1993) (No. 92-780); Supreme Court Review, NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, NAT. L.J., Aug. 23,
1993, at S24.
139. JOSEPH, supra note 123, at 58-59 ("There is no Robin Hood exception to RICO.
There is no 'safe harbor' for miscreant enterprises, whatever their motivation. If all the
statutory criteria are satisfied ....
the statute has been violated. 'Economic motivation' is beside
the point.").
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perpetrating the criminal acts." ° This is reinforced by the fact that an
enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), or (c) can be a
nonprofit legal entity that need not generate money or realize profit of any
kind. 4 ' Therefore, the legislative history confirms the plain meaning of
the statute and that Congress intended RICO "to encompass a wide range of
criminal activity, taking many different forms and likely to attract a broad
regardless of
array of perpetrators operating in many different ways,"
explicitly
mention
failure
to
economic incentives. However, Congress'
opposite
economic motive in the language of the statute may also lead to the
conclusion: arguably, the legislators did not foresee the need to refer
explicitly to economic motive because they assumed such a motive was
necessary.'43
B. An Implied Economic Motive Requirement UnderRICO Should
Encompass Economic Impact in Anti-Abortion Protest Cases
Even if the Supreme Court affirms Scheidler and decides to require
economic motive as prerequisite to a RICO claim, it cannot be assumed that
anti-abortionists lack financial incentive simply because they are nontraditional RICO actors. While the primary means of achieving anti-abortion
goals is superficially driven by an emotional plea for the fetus's "right to
life," a more sophisticated analysis of the protest groups reveals an intricate
structure which has proven itself able to support and encourage illegal
activities that negatively influence the supply of abortion-related services.
Therefore, the economic motive requirement under RICO when applied to
anti-abortionists and other enterprises whose agenda do not precisely fit into
preconceived "mobster" molds should be sensitive not only to economic
motivation, but to economic impact on the market as well.'" Anti-abortion
protests interfere with a health clinic's ability to conduct business and
therefore, have a direct financial impact on the industry as a whole. 4 The
140. Although Congress focused on organized crime, it stressed liberal interpretation of

RICO. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947.

141. See, e.g., Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 809 F.2d 1016, 1018 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
482 U.S. 915 (1987) (court constituted an "enterprise" under RICO); United States v. Yonan,
800 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987) (prosecutor's office

considered "enterprise" under RICO); United States v. Hocking, 860 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Illinois Dep't of Transportation fit within definition of "enterprise" for purposes of RICO.)
142. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 (1989).
143. Gale, supra note 63, at 1358-59 & n.135.

144. See Frans J. von Kaenel, Comment, The Seventh CircuitBestows Immunity from RICO

Prosecutions Upon Anti-Abortion Protestors, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 175 (1993) (arguing that
Scheidler should have expanded the economic motivation requirement to encompass economic
impact); see also Gale, supra note 63, at 1349, 1368.
145. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Health Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342,
1346-47 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (clinic forced to install sophisticated
security equipment to thwart repeated attempts at criminal trespass by protestors); Dinah R.
PoKempner, Note, The Scope of Noerr Immunity for DirectAction Protestors: Anti-Tnst Meets
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mere existence of a mixed motive should not preclude RICO's application
altogether.

Even when applied to traditional RICO enterprises in the commercial
business world, the economic motive requirement does not measure profit
merely by counting the amount of money in a company's coffers." 4 Profit
is also measured by the indirect effect a company's activities has on
competitors in the marketplace. For example, most would agree that the
establishment of a company's "No Questions Asked" rebate policy for
dissatisfied customers is ultimately grounded in and supported by an
underlying economic motive. The company benefits long term if its
customers are satisfied, even if it means lost profit in the short term.
Similarly, anti-abortion protesters "profit" politically when protests bring
immediate attention to the issue of abortion and economically by soliciting
funds to support future action. 47 By harassing clinic employees, doctors,
patients and landlords, the protestors have the effect of forcing clinics out of
regional markets, and sometimes, out of business altogether.'4
There is no question that some anti-abortion protesters aim to, and do,
push abortion clinics out of the marketplace. Often protest efforts are
consciously targeted at one geographic area where a concerted series of
attacks is orchestrated on clinics over a short period in hopes that abortion

the Anti-Abortionists, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 662, 665-68 (1989) ("Protests that seek to interfere
with the conduct of business force abortion clinics to invest more heavily in security measures,
insurance, and litigation, and make it more difficult for clinics to retain qualified personnel.").
146. The Second Circuit's RICO decisions involving international terrorism support this
proposition. See United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Bagaric,
706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983); United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d
843 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985). While the Second Circuit has not yet
decided whether its economic motivation requirement applies similarly to anti-abortion protest
cases, it appears that the Court's economic motive rationale is nevertheless "concerned with
preventing crimes that cause victims to lose money rather than with crimes that necessarily result
in the defendants gaining money for personal profit." Gale, supra note 63, at 1369.
147. In fact, anti-abortion groups control the disposition of large sums of money.
Operation Rescue acknowledged the receipt of $300,000 in donations for 1989, and others
estimate the organization receives over $1 million annually in donations. See Faludi, supra note
3, at Cl. Michael McMonagle, executive director of the Pro-Life Coalition of Southeastern
Pennsylvania reported raising $120,000 a year for the organization. See Northeast Women's
Center, Inc., 868 F.2d at 1349 n.7. McMonagle sent out a fund raising letter crediting the loss
of an abortion clinic's lease in 1986 to the "persistent prayers and protests of Pro-Life citizens."
Id. at 1346 n.3.
148. See American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Pennsylvania Section v.
Thornburgh, 613 F. Supp. 656, 658-61 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (doctors refused to work at clinics
under same management as other clinics which were the targets of repeated protest). As a direct
result of increasingly violent protests, vacant physician positions at health clinics providing
abortion services and reproductive counseling are commonplace. See Sara Rimer, Abortion
Clinics Seek Doctors But Find Few, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1993, at A-14; Sandra G.
Boodman, The Dearth of Abortion Doctors; Stigma, Low Pay andLack of PersonalCommitment
Erode Ranks, WASH. POST, April 20, 1993, at Z7.
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services become wholly unavailable in the region during that time. 49
Between 1982 and 1985 alone, activist-related arson and bombing caused
more than $4.6 million in property damage and have forced clinics to
provide additional security measures for patients and to obtain expensive
business insurance.150 According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute, abortion services are now unavailable in 83 percent of America's counties. 15 '
Nationally, the number of medical schools that teach abortion techniques has
declined from 24 percent in 1985 to 12 percent in 1991.152
In addition to the emotional and psychological strain on individual
women seeking intensely personal medical care, the demonstrations also have
a costly impact on the community.1 3 Towns and cities are forced to
expend scarce resources on police, fire, and medical services in order to cope
with repeated protests and thousands of protesters clog local courts and jails
at great public expense. 54 The groups' activities, therefore have an
undeniable economic impact on health care and other service industries. 55
CONCLUSION

NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler is an important case because the question of an
economic motivation requirement in all civil RICO claims has broad
implications that reach far beyond the explosive abortion arena from which
the debate arose. The split in the Circuit Courts of Appeals reveals wide
disparity in judicial approach and philosophy, probably because RICO's
statutory language was purposely designed to be ambiguous. The ambiguity,
for better or worse, has opened the door to interpretations which support its
union with highly emotional political causes. The Seventh Circuit's narrow
149. For example, in September 1992, fourteen Michigan clinics were attacked within a
two-week period and on one single day in March 1993, five San Diego clinics were sprayed with
butyric acid. See S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RESOURCES, FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC
ENTRANCES ACT, S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Committee Reports File, at *5.
150. Moretti, supra note 28, at 1390.
151. Warner, supra note 6, at 87.
152. Sharman Stein, Abortion Doctors Under Seige, CHI. TRIB., March 12, 1993, at 1.
153. S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RESOURCES, FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC
ENTRANCES ACT, S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Committee Reports File, at *3.("In addition to destroying clinics and severely limiting
access to health care, arson and bombings have resulted in injuries to firefighters and caused
millions of dollars in property damage. From January through May 1993 alone, three reported
acts of arson in Florida, Texas, and Montana caused over $1.5 million in damages.").
154. Lewin, supra note 3, at A16. See also Renee Graham, Demonstrationsa "Financial
Strain" on Town, BOSTON GLOBE, March 5, 1989, at 40 (single day's arrest of anti-abortion
demonstrators would cost the city of Brookline, Mass. $10,000 to $20,000).
155. Moretti, supra note 28, at 1394. RICO's treble damage provision of 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c) has been invoked in an attempt by medical clinics and health facilities filing private civil
actions under RICO to turn the economic tables on protesters. The clinics hope to deter
protesters with the threat of hefty monetary penalties, imposed by a federal court judgment. In
this way, the clinics hope to sap the financial resources of the anti-abortionists whose unlawful
acts drain the courts, the community, and the medical industry of operating capital.
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view of RICO in Scheidler not only fails to follow completely the reasoning
of Second and Eighth Circuit precedent, but it also fails to recognize the
liberal construction drafters of the legislation intended. The Supreme Court
should rectify this error and find that the plain language of civil RICO
requires no economic motive. In the alternative, any implied economic
motive the Court wishes to acknowledge should encompass economic impact
or affect in anti-abortion protest cases. Any less generous interpretation is
unsupported by legislative history and would unduly burden the federal
law's ability to fight and deter the types of crime state law is unable to reach.
Scheidler also reflects a current trend in anti-abortion protest cases in
which plaintiffs seeking protection of federal laws have been met with
substantive and procedural barriers to relief. Most recently, in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,"56 the Supreme Court ruled that federal
civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983(c), popularly known as the Klu Klux
Klan Act, does not provide a federal cause of action against persons
obstructing access to abortion clinics."
However, while the Supreme
Court moves in the direction of limiting federal jurisdiction in anti-abortion
protest cases, individual state legislatures, 5 8 Congress,'59 and the Department of Justice under the newly-elected administration,"' ° have embarked
on a path of expanding that jurisdiction.
Invocation of RICO in anti-abortion protest cases has traditionally been
a last resort for private plaintiffs seeking federal relief on both legal and
equitable grounds.16' This is probably due to the federal courts' split on
determining the proper role and scope of RICO in such cases, 62 and the
reluctance to give full effect to the statute's liberal construction clause. 63

156. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
157. Id. at 758-64. In Bray, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, declared that the clinic

had not shown that the protesters' actions were the result of an "invidiously discriminatory

animus," id. at 758, because "[o]pposition to abortion cannot reasonable be presumed to reflect
a sex-based intent; there are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than

a derogatory view of women as a class." Id. at 760.
158. See Steven Lee Myers, Bill to BarAbortion Clinic Blockades, N.Y. TIMEs, March 23,
1993, at B4 (New York State Assembly votes 106 to 35 to change the state's penal code to
define blocking of a medical center as aggravated harassment, a misdemeanor punishable by up
to a year in prison).
159. See infra note 164.
160. See Karen Tumulty, Reno Callsfor Bill to ProtectAbortion Clinics, L.A. TIME, April

2, 1993, at A4 (calling for legislation extending federal protection to women seeking access to
abortion clinics a "top priority").
161. Eve Paul, General Counsel for the Planned Parenthood Federation admits that "RICO
is not the ideal vehicle, but we don't have a lot of vehicles." See Gregg Krupa, Supreme Court
Puts Abortion on Back Burner, BOSTON GLOBE, March 16, 1993, at 6.
162. See supra notes 61-93 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 51; Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 523 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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With the newly created Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act,
specifically targeted at anti-abortion protesters in an attempt to supplement
existing but inadequate state and local laws, as well as to recognize the
limitations of other federal remedies," the use of RICO may remain a last
resort. However, because Congress was specific in its intent not to pre-empt
the enforcement of applicable state or federal laws, be they criminal or civil
in nature,'1 and because RICO can still offer plaintiffs the imposition of
the "racketeering" label, 67 broad concepts of standing,"6 ' and especially

164. In late November, 1993, both Houses of Congress passed virtually identical versions
of a bill entitled the "Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993." The Senate version
would amend Title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aaa (1988) as
follows:
SEC. 2715 FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES.
(a) Prohibited activities. Whoever(1) By force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures,
intimidates, or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any
person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or
any other person or class of persons from obtaining or providing pregnancy or
abortion-related services: *Provided, however,* That nothing in this section shall be
construed as expanding or limiting the authority of States to regulate the performance
of abortions or the availability of pregnancy or abortion-related services; ....
shall be subject ... to the civil remedies provided in subsection (c) ....
(c) Civil Remedies.
(1) Right of Action(A) In General. Any person aggrieved by reason of the conduct prohibited by
subsection (a) may commence a civil action for the relief set forth in subparagraph
(B), except that such action may be brought under subsection (a)(1) only by a person
involved in providing or seeking to provide, or obtaining or seeking to obtain,
services in a medical facility that provides pregnancy or abortion-related services.
(B) Relief. In any action under subparagraph (A), the court may award appropriate
relief, including temporary, preliminary or permanent injunctive relief and
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as the costs of suit and reasonable fees
for attorneys and expert witnesses. With respect to compensatory damages, the
plaintiff may elect, at any time prior to the rendering of final judgment, to recover,
in lieu of actual damages, an award of statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 per
violation.
(d) Rules of Construction. Nothing in this section shall be construed or interpreted
to ....
(3) Provide exclusive authority to prosecute, or exclusive penalties for, acts that may
be violations of this section and that are violations of other federal laws;
(4) Limit or otherwise affect the right of a person aggrieved by acts that may be
violations of this section to seek other available civil remedies; ....
S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
165. See Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, S. 636, § 2(a)(5), (6), (11), (12), &
(13), 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose).
166. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, S. 636, § 2715(D), 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); supra note 164.
167. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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the mandatory treble damages award, 69 it can remain a viable, and at
times, preferable civil remedy.
Karen Beretsky"

Author's note:
On January 24, 1994, the Supreme Court decided the case of Now, Inc. v. Scheidler. Now, Inc.
v. Scheidler, No. 92-780, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1143 (Jan. 24, 1994). Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a unanimous Court, held that RICO does not require proof that either the
racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) were
economically motivated. Id. at *24. The Court found, as a simple matter of statutory
construction, that nowhere in § 1962(c) or in § 1961's definitions of "enterprise" and "pattern
of racketeering activity" is the indication that the framers of RICO required proof of a profitseeking motive. Id. at *14; see supra Part IV.A. In addition, the Court admitted that while it
is arguable that an "enterprise" engaged in interstate or foreign commerce suggests that the
enterprise, by its nature, would have a profit-seeking motive, "the language in § 1962(c) does
not stop there; it concludes enterprises whose activities 'affect' interstate or foreign commerce."
Id. at *15; see supra Part IV.B. The Court rejected the argument that the use of the term
'enterprise" in § 1962 (a) and (b), although "arguably tied in with economic motivation" leads
to the inference of a economic motivation requirement in § 1962(c). Id. at *15. Noting that the
term "enterprise" in subsections (a) and (b) "plays a different role in the structure of those
subsections than it does in subsection (c)," the Court distinguished the enterprise in (a) and (b)
as the "victim of unlawful activities." Id. In contrast, the enterprise in (c) "connotes generally
the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed." Id. see
supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.

168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988); supra note 37; 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988); supra
note 38; 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988); supra note 39. Compare Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, S. 636, § 2715(c)(1)(A), 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (limiting availability of
civil action by private plaintiff to only those persons "involved in providing or seeking to
provide, or obtaining or seeking to obtain services in a medical facility that provides pregnancy
or abortion-related services"); supra note 164.
169. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 713 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987)
("civil RICO requires that a successful plaintiff be awarded treble damages"). Compare Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, S. 636, § 2715(c)(1)(B), 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(compensatory and punitive damages, costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert
witnesses available for private plaintiff); § 2715(c)(2)(B) & (3)(B) (temporary, preliminary, or
permanent injunctive relief, compensatory damages awarded, and civil penalties imposed in
action brought by Attorney Generals of United States or individual States).
* B.A., 1988, Wilkes College; Expected J.D., 1994, California Western School of Law.
I am grateful to Professor Daniel B. Yeager for his teaching, guidance and encouragement. I
also wish to thank Joan McNamara for helpful editing.
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